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Abstract
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is
either uni- or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even
with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the
literature. The Stackelberg (ST) procedure assumes that votes are taken one dimension at a
time according to an exogenously specied sequence. The Kramer-Shepsle (KS) procedure also
assumes that votes are taken separately on each dimension, but not in a sequential way. A
vector of policies is a Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium if each component coincides with the majority
choice on this dimension given the other components of the vector.
We study the existence and uniqueness of the ST and KS equilibria, and we compare them,
looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under
which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on the
utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well behaved. We especially stress the
importance of single crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions: a
marginal version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a joint version whose
denition involves both policy dimensions.
Keywords: Unidimensional and bidimensional type space, single crossing, one-sided sepa-
rability
JEL Codes: D72, H41
1 Introduction
It is well known that majority voting suers from what Bernheim and Slavov (2009) call the
\curse of multidimensionality": when the policy space is suciently rich, there is no policy
option that gathers a majority of votes when faced with all other possible options {i.e., there
is no Condorcet winner (see e.g. Plott 1967, Davis, DeGroot and Hinich 1972, McKelvey,
Ordeshook and Ungar 1980, Banks, Duggan and Le Breton 2006 and Banks and Austen-Smith
1999).
To the best of our knowledge, all rigorous formal versions of this result assume that the
space of voters' types is multidimensional, with a probability distribution of voters' types whose
support is multidimensional as well. Also, the respective roles of the properties of the types'
distribution function and of utility functions are not clearly disentangled. For instance, in
the spatial model of politics (where preferences are Euclidean), the symmetry of preferences is
imposed and the focus is exclusively on the distribution of voters' types. The rst objective
of this paper is to ll this gap and to study the existence of a Condorcet winner with a
unidimensional type space.
Faced with this \curse of multidimensionality", the applied political economy literature has
adopted several approaches, including the obvious one of restricting the policy space to be
unidimensional. In this paper, we adopt a bidimensional policy space and we focus on two
widely used approaches having in common that votes never take place simultaneously on all
dimensions.
The rst approach assumes that citizens vote sequentially on each dimension. An exogenous
ordering of the dimensions is considered and, at each voting stage, the outcomes of the preceding
votes are known to the voters. For instance, when there are two dimensions, a rst majority
vote is organized on one of the policy dimensions and is followed by a second majority vote on
the other dimension. We call Stackelberg (ST) equilibria the policies that can be supported
at equilibrium for a particular ordering of the dimensions. This sequential resolution has been
used by many authors in political economy models (see e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999,
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Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby 2004, Cremer, De Donder and Gahvari 2004, Cremer et al. 2007,
De Donder, Le Breton and Peluso 2009, Etro 2006, Gregorini 2009, Haimanko, Le Breton and
Weber 2005).
The second approach assumes instead that there is no sequential ordering of the votes, but
that they are taken separately on each dimension. Under the presumption that all dimensions
except one have been settled, citizens cast their vote on the residual dimension. A solution
is consistent if the vector of policies obtained through that procedure is self-supporting in a
Nash-like manner. This idea has been independently developed by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle
(1979) and hereafter we will call Kramer-Shepsle's equilibria (KS) the policy vectors meeting
this consistency condition. More precisely, a vector is a Kramer-Shepsle's equilibrium if, for
any dimension, the corresponding component in the vector coincides with the majority choice
on this dimension given the other components of the policy vector. This concept has also been
studied by the applied political economy literature, e.g. by De Donder and Hindriks (1998),
Diba and Feldman (1984), Nechyba (1997), Sadanand and Williamson (1991). On the other
hand, to the best of our knowledge, the only theoretical contributions are two unpublished
papers by Banks and Duggan (2004) and Duggan (2001).
In this paper, we provide an analysis of the KS and ST equilibria in a general framework
with a bidimensional policy space. We study their existence, uniqueness and we compare them,
looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under
which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on
the utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well-behaved. We especially stress
the importance of single-crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions:
a \marginal" version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a \joint" ver-
sion whose denition involves both policy dimensions. We perform this analysis rst with a
unidimensional type space, and then with a bidimensional type space.
Our results run as follows. Starting with a unidimensional type space, we show that the
\curse of multidimensionality" (of the policy space) applies in this case as well: even when we
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assume that the utility function satises both marginal and joint single-crossing, there is gener-
ically no Condorcet winner and, perhaps more surprisingly, in most cases and for any policy
proposal, it is possible to nd a direction that is favored by quasi all voters. We then study
the KS and ST equilibria in this setting. We show that marginal single crossing guarantees
the existence and unicity of the KS solution, and that assuming also strategic complementarity
between policy dimensions results in the KS equilibrium to coincide with the unique ST equi-
librium (independently of the ordering of votes). We then study a specic environment that
has received a lot of attention in dierent literatures (e.g. on nation formation) and which does
not satisfy the marginal single-crossing property. We show that the ST equilibrium studied in
the literature corresponds to the KS equilibrium, but that the ST equilibrium with the opposite
sequence of votes (which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied previously) is more
complex, with the identity of the second-stage decisive voter being aected by the rst-stage
voting decision. We provide a thorough analysis of how rst-stage voting is impacted in that
case (i.e., how voters bias their rst-stage voting choices when anticipating the impact on the
second-stage decisive voter's identity).
We then move to a bidimensional type space. We do not study the existence of a simulta-
neous Condorcet winner in this setting since, in contrast to the one-dimensional types' space
case, this analysis would be very similar to what has already been done in theoretical political
science (Banks and Austen-Smith 1999, Ordeshook 1986). Instead, we focus on the analysis of
the sets of Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria. We show that marginal single-crossing
ensures the existence of KS equilibria, but not their uniqueness. We then move to the well
known spatial framework, which is often used in the political science literature, and we show
that KS and ST equilibria are unique and coincide when individuals dier in the (bidimen-
sional) location of their most-preferred policy but share the same shape of their indierence
curves. We provide an example with a discrete number of types diering both in the location
and in the shape of their indierence curves and where i) there are multiple KS equilibria, ii)
not all KS equilibria correspond to ST equilibria (whatever the ordering of the votes) and iii)
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some KS equilibria do not correspond to any voter's most-preferred policy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the one-dimensional type general
framework. Its rst subsection analyzes simultaneous voting, the second subsection studies
and compares Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria, while the third subsection is devoted
to the analysis of a specic environment studied e.g. in the nation formation literature. Section
3 focuses on the case with two-dimensional types. General results about ST and KS equilibria
are reported in section 3.1., while section 3.2. analyzes the standard set up of spatial voting
with quadratic preferences. Section 4 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to Appendices.
2 One-Dimensional Types
Throughout the paper, we consider a population of voters who have to select a public policy in
a two-dimensional policy space. A policy choice is therefore a vector (x; y) 2 X; where the set of
feasible policy choicesX is assumed to be a rectangular subset of <2.1 In this section, we assume
that each voter is described by a one-dimensional type  2 <. The statistical distribution of
types is given by a continuous cumulative distribution function F whose support is an interval
[; ] of <, with f the corresponding density. The utility of a citizen of type  for policy (x; y)
is denoted by V (; x; y) that is assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable and concave in
x and y. The following examples illustrate the broad spectrum of applications covered by this
framework.
Example 1 (Absolute Intensity of the Preference for Public Goods)
LetX = <2+ and V (; x; y) = U(x; y) (x+y) where U is a twice continuously dierentiable,
increasing and concave function of x and y. In this setting, x and y denote the quantities of
two dierent pure public goods produced under constant returns to scale and nanced through
per capita taxation. The parameter  reects the intensity of the preference for the bundle
(x; y) of public goods (aggregated through U) with respect to the private numeraire.
1This implies that the choice over one dimension does not have any implication on the feasible choices over
the other dimension. A more general case is the subject of Banks and Duggan (2004).
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Example 2 (Proportional IncomeTaxation)
LetX = <2+ and V (; x; y) = U(x; y)   (x+y) where U is a twice continuously dierentiable,
increasing and concave function of x and y and  =
R 

f()d. In this setting, x and y denote,
once again, the quantities of two dierent pure public goods produced under constant returns
to scale. The parameter  denotes the income of a citizen. Under that interpretation, V is
simply the indirect utility of a citizen with income  when the contribution to the nancing of
the public good is proportional to income.
Example 3 (Absolute and Relative Intensities of the Preferences for Public
Goods)
Let X = <2+ and V (; x; y) = Ax()y () (x+y) where A is a positive parameter and  and
 are continuously dierentiable and increasing functions with values in ]0; 1[. The economic
interpretation is the same as in Example 1 with preferences for public goods assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas. However, the parameter  now plays two roles: it describes both the absolute
intensity of the preference for both public goods and it also determines the marginal rate of
substitution between the two public goods.
Example 4 (Spatial Politics with Dierentiated weights)
Let X = <2 and V (; x; y) =  ()(x  )2    ()(y   )2 where  and  are two positive
continuously dierentiable functions. In this general framework, the parameter  plays two
roles. On one hand, it describes the favorite policy bundle of a citizen regardless of the specic
features of  and  . However, on the other hand, it also determines through these functions
the respective weights placed by a citizen of the two dimensions. In the particular case where
() =  () = 1 for all  in [; ], we obtain the spatial model of politics with the extra
assumption that the support of the distribution is one dimensional (precisely the diagonal).
Example 5 (Local Jurisdictions, Nation Formation and \One and a Half Dimen-
sional" Preferences)
Let X = <+  [0; 1] and V (; x; y) = v(x)	(y   )   x where v is increasing and concave,
	 is increasing to the left of 0 and decreasing to the right of 0 and  2 [0; 1]. In this setting,
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x denotes the quantity of a pure public good while y now denotes a horizontal characteristic
of this public good. This policy environment has been analyzed by many authors, including
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004), Perroni and Scharf (2001)
in the analysis of local jurisdictions, and Etro (2006) and Gregorini (2009) in the exploration
of models of nation formation. It is also reminiscent of the voting environment of Groseclose
(2007) where the horizontal dimension denotes ideology while the other dimension represents
valence (dened as an advantage that a candidate has due to a non-policy factor, such as
incumbency or charisma). All voters have the same preference on the valence dimension (hence
the term \one-and-a-half dimensional" used by Groseclose, 2007).
We rst study the simultaneous voting game over the two dimensions before turning to
sequential voting and the Kramer-Shepsle solution.
2.1 Simultaneous Voting
We now show that in the context of simultaneous voting over a bidimensional policy space with
unidimensional voters' types, the fact that utility functions satisfy reasonable \single-crossing"
conditions does not guarantee the existence of a Condorcet winner. On the contrary, for any
policy proposal, it is always possible to propose an alternative policy that is favored by quasi
all voters. Throughout the paper, we assume the following monotonicity property:
Assumption 1 (Marginal Single-Crossing) We assume that
@2V (; x; y)
@@x
 0 and @
2V (; x; y)
@@y
 0
for all (x; y) 2 X and  2 <.
Assumption 1 simply states that the marginal utility of both dimensions increases monotoni-
cally with the type of the agent. This monotonicity assumption implies that the classical single-
crossing condition (which states that \leftist voters tend to favor left policies more than voters
who are rightist in political preferences" (Myerson, 1996, p.23)) is satised on each dimension
separately, hence the term of marginal single-crossing assumption.
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It is easy to see that Assumption 1 is satised in Examples 1 and 2,2 and also in Example
3 if x and y are large enough. As for Example 4, we obtain @
2V (;x;y)
@@x
= 2()  20()(x  ).
The rst term is always positive while the second term can take negative values. It is enough
to bound the second term. Since jx  j is always less than 1, Assumption 1 holds as soon as
0() is not too large. If we denote by m the minimum of () over [; ], then it will hold
whenever j0()j < m. The same analysis applies to @2V (;x;y)
@@y
.
Assumption 1 does not hold for Example 5. We obtain @
2V (;x;y)
@@x
=  v0(x)	0(y   ) and
@2V (;x;y)
@@y
=  	00(y   ). The second-order derivative is always positive but the sign of the
rst-order derivative depends upon the position of y with respect to : its sign is positive i
y > . This example is thus not covered by the results of this section and, given its importance
in the literature, is analyzed separately in section 2.3.
We denote by x(y; ) (respectively, y(x; )) individual 's most-preferred value of x (resp.,
of y) for any given y (resp., given x). The following lemma (proved in Appendix 1) shows
that concavity of the utility function together with Assumption 1 guarantee that i) the most-
preferred value of x (respectively, of y) is increasing in , for any given y (resp., given x) and ii)
the individual with the median type med is decisive in both choices if they are taken separately.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1,
i) the most-preferred value of x (respectively, of y) is increasing in , for any given y (resp.,
given x):
@x (y; )
@
 0 and @y (x; )
@
 0;
ii) there exists a majority voting equilibrium when voting over x for any given y (resp., over
y for any given x){i.e., a value of x such that there is no x0 6= x that is favored by more than
one half of the voters to x (and similarly for y) . This equilibrium (called the one-dimensional
Condorcet winner), which we denote by xm(y) (resp., ym(x)), corresponds to the value of x
2Up to a change of sign in Example 2. This change of sign is innocuous here, as all our results in this section
hold mutatis mutandis when marginal rates of substitution are monotonically decreasing in .
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(resp., of y) that is most-preferred by the individual with the median type, med:
xm(y) = x(y; med) 8y 2 <;
ym(x) = y(x; med) 8x 2 <:
The following proposition (proved in Appendix 2) shows that, if a Condorcet winner exists
when voting simultaneously over the two dimensions, then it must be the most-preferred policy
bundle of the individual with the median type, med:
Proposition 1 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space,
under Assumption 1, the majority equilibrium (x; y) under simultaneous voting over both
dimensions, if it exists, must be the unique ideal point of the median type voter med:
x = x(y; med) and y = y(x; med):
We now investigate under which conditions a vector (xs; ys) (called the status quo hereafter)
is preferred by a majority of voters to any local deviation. We establish the conditions under
which an individual votes in favor of a motion moving away from the status quo in a (arbitrary)
direction d = (dx; dy) 2 <2. The change in the utility of a voter of type  induced by d is3
'()  @V (; (x
s; ys))
@x
dx +
@V (; (xs; ys))
@y
dy:
The population of voters who favor a move from the status quo in the direction d is composed of
all the types for which '() > 0: In particular we focus on the local Condorcet winner, dened
as a policy pair (x; y) such that for any vector (dx; dy) 2 <2 and any " > 0, the mass of
citizens who strictly prefer (x+ "dx; y+ "dy) to (x; y) is less than or at most equal to 12 .
To test whether the policy pair (x; y) dened in Proposition 1 is a local Condorcet winner,
we introduce the function
(d) =
Z
f2[;]:'()>0g
dF;
3The function ' also depends on d and on the status quo, but we simplify the notation by writing '():
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which measures the proportion of voters favoring a deviation in direction d from the status quo
(x; y).
Observe that '0()  @2V (;x;y)
@@x
dx+
@V 2(;x;y)
@@y
dy, and that '(med) = 0 since (x
; y) is the
most-preferred bundle of individual med. By Assumption 1, we obtain that '
0() > 0 if dx > 0
and dy > 0, which means that all individuals favoring this direction d are such that  > med. By
denition, this interval of types represents one half of the polity, so that (d) = 1=2. Similarly,
'0() < 0 if dx < 0 and dy < 0, so that all individuals with  < med (and only them) favor the
direction d, and (d) = 1=2. In words, if the deviation considered either increases or decreases
both dimensions, then the individuals favoring this deviation are to be found only on one side
of the median and are thus not numerous enough to defeat the status quo.
We now turn to deviations with both a positive and a negative component. Individuals
with  > med benet from the positive component of the deviation but suer from the negative
component, and vice versa for the individuals with  < med. The set of voters who favor such a
deviation may then be disjoint and could comprise both people above and below med. We now
characterize this set and study whether they represent more than one half of the electorate.
Consider without loss of generality the case where d is such that dx > 0 and dy < 0. Recall
that voters who favor a direction d are such that '() > 0. Denoting by
MRS() =
@V (;x;y)
@x
@V (;x;y)
@y
the (absolute value of)4 the marginal rate of substitution between x and y at (x; y) for
individual , we obtain that voters who favor the direction d are such that  > med together
with MRS() >  dx=dy (i.e., those for whom the utility gain from a larger value of x is
bigger than the utility loss from the lower value of y); or such that  < med together with
MRS() <  dx=dy (i.e., those for whom the utility gain from a smaller value of y is bigger
4Note that, under Assumption 1, the marginal rate of substitution at (x; y) is negative for all individ-
uals since @V (; x; y)=@x > 0 and @V (; x; y)=@y > 0 for all  > med while @V (; x; y)=@x < 0 and
@V (; x; y)=@y < 0 for all  < med: Slightly abusing notation, we denote by MRS(med) the limit, as  tends
towards med, of MRS().
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than the utility loss from the larger value of x). The identication of the coalition of citizens
 (dx; dy) supporting the deviation is illustrated on Figure 1 below, where we represent the
MRS measured at (x; y) as a function of . It is important to note that this coalition need
not be connected.5
Insert Figure 1 about here
The construction itself shows that the circumstances for having (x; y) undefeated are very
exceptional. Indeed, given the choice of  dx=dy, if the set

 2 [; ] :MRS() =  dx=dy
	
has measure 0 for F , then it must the case that the coalition  (dx; dy) and its complement
[; ]n(dx; dy) have both a measure equal to 12 with respect to F for the policy (x; y) to be
a local Condorcet winner. This may happen for some specic value of  dx=dy but then a small
perturbation of dx=dy is likely to destroy this property.
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We then impose further structure on the problem in the hope of nding circumstances under
which a local Condorcet winner exists. An interesting benchmark, often used in the political
economy literature, is the case where the utility function exhibits the single-crossing or Spence-
Mirrlees's condition (Gans and Smart 1996, Rothstein 1990){i.e., where the marginal rate of
substitution is monotone7 in :
Assumption 2 (Joint Single-crossing) We assume that
@V (; x; y)=@x
@V (; x; y)=@y
is increasing in 
for all (x; y) 2 X and  2 <.
5If we consider for instance the specic frameworks of Examples 3 and 4 for the bundle (x; y) = (med; ymed),
we obtain that MRS() = () () . This function can display any sort of chaotic behavior for convenient selection
of the functions  and  .
6This reasoning does not hold when MRS () is constant since, for any given directional deviation, the
society is always divided equally. We provide an example of such a case after Proposition 2 below.
7The subsequent analysis would carry through to the case where the MRS is monotone decreasing in type.
Note that there is no logical connection between the two single-crossing conditions that we study (Assumptions
1 and 2) in the sense that neither implies nor precludes the other.
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We then obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space,
under Assumptions 1 (marginal single-crossing) and 2 (joint single crossing):
a) There is no majority equilibrium: the policy bundle (x; y) is defeated at the majority by
most of the deviations d such that dxdy < 0.
b) Moreover, there exists a deviation ~d = ( ~dx; ~dy) with ~dx ~dy < 0 that is preferred by all voters
(except med) to (x
; y).
In order to prove Proposition 2, we use Figure 2, where we make use of Assumption 2. The
rst panel depicts the case where MRS(med) <  dy=dx. In that case, all individuals below
med prefer the deviation. This is also the case for individuals with  > med who are such
that MRS() >  dy=dx. A strict majority favors d if this second group is not empty, which
is the case provided that MRS() >  dy=dx {i.e., that dy is not too large or dx not too small
(in absolute values). Figure 2(b) illustrates the case where MRS(med) >  dy=dx. In that
case, all people with  > med favor the deviation, together with individuals with  < med
for which MRS() <  dy=dx. As soon as this second group is not empty (which is the case if
MRS() <  dy=dx{i.e., that dy is not too small or dx not too large, in absolute values), a strict
majority of voters favor the deviation. Moreover, as explained above, if strictly less than 50%
favor the deviation d, and if the set of individuals with MRS() =  dx=dy is not too large,
then strictly more than 50% of the voters favor the deviation  d. This proves Proposition 2
(a).
The third panel of Figure 2 shows that, if the deviation ~d is such that MRS(med) =  dy=dx,
all voters (except of course med) favor this deviation, proving part b) of Proposition 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here
While the reader may not be surprised by part a) of Proposition 2, part b) is more surpris-
ing, since in that case there is a unanimity against the median voter's most-preferred policy,
even under marginal and joint single crossing conditions. The fact that single crossing is not
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conducive to the existence of an equilibrium can be shown when studying one family of pref-
erences (not satisfying Assumption 2) where we can guarantee the existence of a Condorcet
winner, whatever the distribution function F . Assume that the function V is symmetrical with
respect to the variables x and y :
V (; x; y) = V (; y; x) for all ; x and y in <:
In that case, x = y and MRS() = 1 for all  6= med. This means that individuals with
 > med favor all deviations d such that either dx > 0 and dy > 0, or that dxdy < 0 together
with jdyj < jdxj, and oppose all other deviations. Likewise, individuals with  < med favor all
deviations d such that either dx < 0 and dy < 0, or that dxdy < 0 together with jdyj > jdxj,
and oppose all other deviations. We then obtain that (d) = 1=2 for all d, so that (x; y)
is a Condorcet winner whatever the distribution F of types. The intuition for this result is
that assuming a perfectly symmetrical utility function brings us back essentially to the realm
of one-dimensional policies, where the classical median voter theorem applies.
The take home message of this section is then that, except in very peculiar circumstances
such as a perfectly symmetrical utility function, there is little hope of nding a Condorcet
winner when voting simultaneously over the two dimensions, even when the type space is
unidimensional and single crossing conditions are satised.
We now move to the other equilibrium concepts studied in this paper, those proposed by
Kramer and Shepsle, and by Stackelberg.
2.2 Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria
Let us examine rst the Kramer-Shepsle equilibria.
Denition 1 A Kramer-Shepsle (or KS) equilibrium is a policy vector (xKS; yKS) such that
xKS = xm(y
KS) and yKS = ym(x
KS):
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With X convex8, and since the functions xm() and ym() are continuous, we deduce from
Brouwer's xed point theorem that there always exists a KS equilibrium. Under Assumption
1, if (xKS; yKS) is a KS equilibrium then we have
@V (med; x
KS; yKS)
@x
= 0 and
@V (med; x
KS; yKS)
@y
= 0; (1)
i.e., (xKS; yKS) is an optimal policy for a med type voter. Since this point is unique, there
exists a unique KS equilibrium in such a setting. We have thus proved the following.
Proposition 3 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space,
under Assumption 1, there exists a unique KS equilibrium (xKS; yKS) that coincides with the
optimal policy of the med type voter.
Let us now move to the set of Stackelberg (or ST) equilibria that arise when there is a
sequence of two votes. We assume (without loss of generality at this stage) that individuals
are rst called to vote over x and then, after having observed the voting outcome of this rst
round, that they vote over y. We solve for these ST equilibria and compare them with both the
SK equilibrium and with the ST equilibria under the opposite sequence (where voters choose
rst y and then x).
Solving backward, we know from Lemma 1 that, for any outcome x in the rst stage, the
majority voting equilibrium in the second stage is the most-preferred value of y of the median
type med, so that
ym(x) = argmax
y
V (med; x; y)
= y(med; x):
This implies that, in the rst stage, the reduced utility of a citizen of type  for x is equal to
U(; x) = V (; x; ym(x)):
8Since X has been assumed to be rectangular, this implies that the projections of X on the two axis are
intervals.
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Denition 2 A Stackelberg (or ST) equilibrium when voters choose rst x and then y is a
policy vector (xST ; yST ) such thatZ
f2[;]:U(;x) U(;xST )>0g
f()d  1
2
for all x 2 R
and yST = ym(x
ST ):
Of course, the rst part of the denition of ST is not easy to test in general. Under
the presumption that the function U(; x) is concave in x for all ,9 the rst-order condition
describing the optimal rst-stage choice of a citizen of type  is given by
xF () = argmax
x
V (med; x; ym(x))
= argmax
x
U(med; x)
and satises
@U(; x)
@x
=
@V (; x; ym (x))
@x
+
@V (; x; ym (x))
@y
dym (x)
dx
= 0: (2)
The rst term of (2) describes the direct eect of varying x on the individual's utility, while the
second term describes the indirect eect through variations in the second-stage voting outcome.
To be able to sign this derivative, we will make an extensive use of the following assumption:
Assumption 3 (Strategic complementarity) We assume that the two policy dimensions
are strategic complements:
@2V (; x; y)
@x@y
 0: (3)
From this assumption, we deduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2 With strategic complements, we have both (a) dym (x) =dx  0 and (b) dxm (y) =dy 
0:
9The rst part of Appendix 6 studies the concavity of U(; x).
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Proof. The proof of (a) comes from the concavity of V (; x; y) in y together with
dym(x)
dx
=  
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
: (4)
The proof of (b) is obtained similarly.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (2), we get
dxF ()
d
=  
@2V (;xF ();ym(xF ()))
@x@
+ @
2V (;xF ();ym(xF ()))
@y@
dym(xF ())
dx
@2U(;xF ())
@x2
:
Since, from the second-order condition, the denominator of this ratio is negative, we deduce
from Assumption 1 and Lemma 2(a) that dx
F ()
d
 0. Recall that Assumption 1 states that
the marginal utility obtained from both dimensions x and y increases with . Coupled with
strategic complementarity of x and y, we then obtain that the most-preferred rst-period value
of x increases with  (since a larger type reaps a larger direct benet from an increase in x and
also benets more from the increase in the equilibrium value of y that a larger x generates).
Since we have assumed that U(; x) is concave in x for all , we can apply the median
voter theorem and we obtain from the monotonicity dx
F ()
d
 0 that the majority equilibrium
is xF (med). But from (2), we know that
@V (med; x
F (med) ; ym(x
F (med)))
@x
+
@V (med; x
F (med) ; ym(x
F (med)))
@y
dym(x
F (med))
dx
= 0:
Since we have also showed that
@V (med; x
F (med) ; ym(x
F (med)))
@y
= 0; (5)
we deduce that
@V (med; x
F (med) ; ym(x
F (med)))
@x
= 0: (6)
In words, the median voter anticipates in the rst stage that he will remain decisive in the
second stage as well. In his rst-stage choice of x, he then ignores (by an envelope theorem ar-
gument) the indirect eect of x on his utility, and chooses the optimal value of x given the value
of y that will result in the second stage. The resulting policy bundle
 
xF (med) ; ym(x
F (med))

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constitutes the unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, comparing equations (1), (5) and
(6) shows that this policy pair is the same as the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium. We can state
the following:
Proposition 4 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space,
under Assumptions 1 (marginal single crossing) and 3 (strategic complementarity) and assum-
ing that the function U(; x) is concave in x for all , the unique Stackelberg equilibrium where
people vote rst over x and then over y coincides with the ideal two-dimensional policy of
the median citizen med, and with the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium. The same equilibrium also
emerges with the opposite sequence of vote (provided that the reduced rst-period utility function
is concave in y).
So, if both dimensions are strategic complements, the order of the vote does not matter
and the ST equilibrium is moreover identical to the KS equilibrium. If both dimensions are
not strategic complements, then the most-preferred rst-stage value of x need not be monotone
in . In that case, it is necessary to consider the decreasing rearrangement ex of x. Then the
median outcome xmed is the solution to the equation
F ( : ex ()  xmed) = 1
2
;
and in general xmed 6= x (med). Also, in that case, the order of the votes matters, since the ST
equilibrium will typically dier according to whether people vote rst over x or over y.
To go beyond these generalities, we need to put more structure on the utility function. In
the next section, we concentrate on a family of utility functions that has been studied at length,
for instance in the nation formation literature.
2.3 One-sided Separability
In this subsection, we focus on the environment described in Example 5, which has received a
great deal of attention in dierent elds. This setting is characterized by both a horizontal and
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a vertical dimension. As already pointed out, Assumption 1 (marginal single crossing) is not
satised so that this setting calls for a separate tailored treatment.
Let us assume that  2 [0; 1] and
V (; x; y) = v(x)	(y   )  x where x 2 <+ and y 2 [0; 1] : (7)
We assume that v is increasing and concave, and that 	 is a function with values in <++,
symmetrical with respect to 0 and increasing to the left of 0.10 We also assume that the
function 	 is dierentiable everywhere, so that 	0(0) = 0.11 This general form describes the
situation of a public policy program with a vertical dimension x (the quantity or quality level
of a public good) and a horizontal dimension y (a characteristic of the public good, such as its
color, location,...). The type  of a voter represents her most-preferred public good variant y
among all feasible options : any departure from this ideal choice decreases her utility for any
value of x. Also, for any xed type of public good y, each voter derives a gross benet from this
public good consumption which increases with x. We assume that the unit cost of production
of the public good is one, that there is a mass one of consumers, and that public provision is
nanced with a lump sum tax. We thus have to subtract x from the gross utility to obtain the
net utility of the public good. Note that the function V (:) is concave in x but not necessarily
in y, as we make no concavity assumption on the function 	(:).
We start by looking at the ST procedure where citizens vote rst over x and then over y.
This is the sequence the jurisdiction and nation formation literatures have focused on. Note
rst that the majority choice over y does not depend upon x, while the converse is not true,
as an individual's willingness to pay for the public good depends on its location. We dub this
property one-sided separability. Whatever the value of x, the majority choice over y, which we
denote by ymed; is given by
ym(x) = y(x; med) = ymed = med:
10Therefore, it is decreasing to the right of 0. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Etro (2006) and Gregorini
(2009) consider the specic case where 	(y; ) =   j   yj where  is a parameter larger than 1.
11This dierentiability assumption is not necessary for our arguments but allows to signicantly simplify some
proofs.
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Given ymed, the reduced utility function takes the form
U(; x) = v(x)	(ymed   )  x:
Given our assumptions on v and 	, U is a concave function of x with a peak at x() where
x() is the unique solution x to the equation
v0(x)	(ymed   ) = 1; (8)
which is the familiar rule equating the marginal utility from the public good to its marginal
taxation cost for individual . It is clear that this peak decreases continuously as  moves away
from med, both to the left and to the right of med. As the function U(:) is concave in x, we
can apply the median voter theorem and assert that there exists a majority equilibrium value
of x; which corresponds to the median most-preferred value of x when y = ymed. As should
be obvious from (8), this decisive individual is not the individual with the median location
med, since this individual is the one with the largest willingness to pay for the public good,
but rather the individual with the median distance to the median (i.e., the median value of
jymed   j, since the function 	(:) is symmetrical around zero). We explain in Appendix 3 how
to solve for the median optimal value of x, which we denote by xmed.
From the above arguments, we deduce that (xmed; ymed) is the unique ST equilibrium when
voting rst over x and then over y. It is also clear that this policy pair is the unique KS
equilibrium as well, since ym(x) = ymed whatever the value of x. We thus have the following
Proposition.
Proposition 5 Given the utility function (7), the policy (xmed; ymed) is the (unique) Kramer-
Shepsle equilibrium and it coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium when people vote rst over
x and then over y.
We now study the Stackelberg equilibrium when we reverse the vote sequence. Given an
arbitrary value of y from the rst vote, consider the second stage of the game{ i.e., the vote over
x. Since the utility function (7) is concave in x, we can apply the median voter theorem to learn
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that the majority chosen x is the median most-preferred value of x given y. The most-preferred
value of x of individual  given y is
x(y; ) = (v0) 1

1
	(y   )

;
which is symmetrical in  around y, and decreasing as  moves away from y. Assume without
loss of generality that y  ymed. Two cases can materialize. In the rst one, the decisive voters
are the individuals located at a distance  from y (to the left or to the right) and such that
F (y + )  F (y   ) = 1
2
; (9)
i.e., such that exactly 50% of the polity is located at a distance at most equal to  from y (and
thus prefer a larger value of x than x(y; y )). Note that equation (9) has a solution provided
that   y { i.e., that y is such that F (2y)  1=2: In words, the majority-chosen value of y
must not be too far from the median (too small if we start with y  ymed as assumed here, or
too large if we had rather started with y  ymed). If y is far enough from ymed, then the decisive
voter is the one with the median location, med, with all the voters with  < med preferring
a larger (resp., lower) value of x than x(y; med) if y  ymed (resp., if y > ymed) and all voters
with  > med preferring a lower (resp. larger) value of x if y  ymed (resp., if y > ymed).
This shows that the identity of the decisive voter(s) in the second stage changes continuously
with the choice made in the rst stage. In terms of policy, this implies that
xm(y) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(v0) 1

1
	(y med)

if y  y;
(v0) 1

1
	((y))

if y  y  y;
(v0) 1

1
	(y med)

if y  y;
where (with an abuse of notation) y is the unique solution to the equation F (2y) = 1=2; y
is the unique solution to the equation F (2y   1) = 1=2 and (y) is given by (9).
Figure 3 depicts the case where F is uniform. Panel (a) shows that (y) is dened only
when y is at most distant of 1/4 from the median value of y, and is constant when it exists. If
y is lower than 1/4 or larger than 3/4, the decisive voter in the choice of x is 1/2, as shown in
panel (b). For intermediate values of y, there are actually two types of decisive voters (panel
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b), both distant of 1/4 from y (panel (a)). Panel (c) shows the majority-chosen value of x for
any given y; xm(y): it rst increases with y (since the decisive voter remains the same, while
his distance from the chosen y decreases), then it is constant with y (even though the identity
of the decisive voters changes with y, they all remain at the same distance from the chosen y),
and nally decreases with y (as the distance between the decisive voter, located at 1/2, and y
increases).
Insert Figure 3 about here
The previous analysis is summarized in part i) of Proposition 6. Moving backward to the
rst stage voting over y, we assume that the utility function of a citizen of type , which is
given by W (y; ) = v(xm(y))	(y   )  xm(y); is concave in y for all . Part ii) of Proposition
6 (proved in Appendix 4) shows that individuals have no incentive to vote for y =  in the rst
stage, but that strategic considerations related to the second-stage choice of x drive them to
vote for a value of x that diers in a systematic way from .
Proposition 6 Given the utility function (7), voting rst over y and then over x,
i) in the second stage, the decisive voter type changes continuously with the choice made in
the rst stage;
ii) in the rst stage, a voter of type  < y (with F (2y) = 1=2) always votes for a value of
y larger than his peak  while a voter of type  > y (where F (2y   1) = 1=2) always votes
for a value of y smaller than his peak . Voters of type y    y always vote for a value of
y larger (resp., smaller) than their peak  if () decreases (resp., increases) with . The sign
of the derivative of () with respect to  only depends upon the distribution function F .
The intuition for part ii) runs as follows. Individuals know that, if they obtain their \naive"
most-preferred location y =  in the rst-stage, the majority chosen public good level x will
be much lower than their most-favored level, because they will be the ones with the largest
willingness to pay for the public good. A small departure from y =  then has a second-
order direct cost (because, although less appealing, the location remains close to their rst-best
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choice) but a rst-order gain, provided that this departure leads to a larger amount of public
good in the second stage. A voter whose peak is to the left of y anticipates that a rst-stage
choice close to their peak will result in the median voter med being decisive in the second
stage. A value of y slightly larger than  will then induce a larger second-stage value of x, as
it increases the willingness to pay for the public good of the med individual (since it decreases
the distance between the rst-stage location choice and his most-preferred location). A similar
reasoning explains why individuals located to the right of y always prefer a value of y that is
smaller than their rst-best choice . Individuals with intermediate preferences (y    y)
anticipate that voters located at a distance (y) from y will be decisive in the second stage. They
then bias their rst-stage choice in order to decrease this distance, so that the decisive voter
increases his most-preferred public good amount. We show in Appendix 4 that the distance
(y) is a function of the distribution function F only.
From Proposition 6 ii), we gather that the rst-stage, most-preferred values of x need not
be monotone in  (once strategic considerations are taken into account), so that the individual
with the median type med need not be the decisive voter. A more precise assessment of the
identity of the rst-stage median voter would necessitate the introduction of functional forms
for the utility function 	 and for the distribution function F . Observe that, in the special case
where F is uniform, the distance (y) is a constant (see Figure 3) so that individuals located
between 1/4 and 3/4 have no incentive to distort their rst-period choice and vote for y = .
The decisive individual in the rst stage is then med, and the rst-stage choice of location is
one half. In that special case, the KS equilibrium is also the ST equilibrium for both voting
sequences.
3 Two-Dimensional Types
In this section, we move to the situation where the type of a voter is two-dimensional. The
statistical distribution of types  = (1; 2) among the voters is now described by a continuous
(i.e. absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on <2) cumulative distribution
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function F whose support is (a subset of) <2; we denote by f the corresponding density. The
utility of a citizen of type  for policy (x; y) remains denoted by V (; x; y), which is twice
continuously dierentiable and concave in (x; y) :
We skip the analysis of the simultaneous voting setting as, in contrast to the one-dimensional
case, it is very similar to what is done in theoretical political science (Banks and Austen-Smith
(1999), Ordeshook (1986)). Instead, we focus on the analysis of the sets of Kramer-Shepsle
and Stackelberg equilibria. A new phenomenon appears. In contrast to the one-dimensional
type setting where the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium was unique under some mild monotonicity
assumption (see Proposition 3), in the two-dimensional type setting, there may exist several
KS equilibria.
Consider the KS equilibrium, and more precisely the vote over y for any given value of
x. Since the utility V is concave with respect to y, the payo of a citizen of type  is then
maximized for a choice y (x; ) such that
@V (; x; y (x; ))
@y
= 0: (10)
We are able to extend Lemma 1 to the bidimensional type setting, provided that the marginal
single crossing assumption introduced in the previous section holds for both dimensions of
types.
Assumption 4 (Marginal Single-Crossing (bidimensional types)) We assume that
@2V (; x; y)
@i@x
 0 and @
2V (; x; y)
@i@y
 0 for i = 1; 2
and for all (x; y) 2 X and  2 <2.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 4, the most-preferred value of x (respectively, of y) is increasing
in i, for any given y (resp., of x):
@x (y; )
@i
 0 and @y (x; )
@i
 0 for i = 1; 2:
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Proof: From the implicit function theorem, we deduce that :
@y (x; )
@i
=  
@2V (;x;y(x;))
@i@y
@2V (;x;y(x;))
@y2
for i = 1; 2:
Since V is concave with respect to y, we deduce that the sign of @y(x;)
@i
is the same as the sign
of @
2V (;x;y(x;))
@i@y
. We proceed similarly to prove that @x(y;)
@i
 0:
How do we relate the most-preferred value of y to the bidimensional voter's type? Graphi-
cally, we can draw in the two-dimensional space (1; 2) the y isopolicy curves describing, for
any given value of y and of x; the one-dimensional set of voters for whom y is the most-preferred
policy given x. This curve is described implicitly by the equation :
y (x; ) = y: (11)
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (11) and making use of the marginal
single crossing assumption (Assumption 4), we obtain that this curve is decreasing, and that
moving in the north-eastern direction leads to larger most-preferred values of y. A typical curve
is represented on Figure 4 below.
Insert Figure 4 here.
Making use of (11), we obtain that there exists (at most) one value of 2 such that, for any
1, x and y, type (1,2) voters most-prefer y when the other dimension is exogenously set at x.
We denote this value of 2 by the function 2 (1; x; y). Since the utility functions V (; x; y) are
single-peaked with respect to y for all x and all , we deduce from the median voter theorem
that, for any x, there exists a majority voting equilibrium corresponding to the median value of
the y isopolicy curve y (x; ). This majority outcome, denoted by ym(x), is the unique solution
to the equation Z +1
 1
d1
Z 2(1;x;y)
 1
f (1; 2) d2 =
1
2
: (12)
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Turning to the choice of x for any given y, we obtain from (11) that there is (at most) one
value of 2 such that, for any 1, x and y, type (1,2) voters most-prefer x when the other
dimension is exogenously set at y. We denote this value of 2 by the function  2 (1; y;x). We
deduce similarly that, for any y, there exists a majority voting equilibrium corresponding to
the median value of the x isopolicy curve x (y; ). This majority outcome, denoted by xm(y),
is the unique solution to the equationZ +1
 1
d1
Z  2(1;y;x)
 1
f (1; 2) d2 =
1
2
:
Since the functions xm(y) and ym(x) are continuous and X is convex, we deduce from
Brouwer's xed point theorem the existence of a Kramer-Shepsle's equilibrium. We have then
proved the following:
Proposition 7 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a bidimensional type space,
under Assumption 4, there always exists at least one KS equilibrium.
The main dierence between Propositions 7 and 3 is twofold. First, we have not proved
the unicity of the KS equilibrium when the type space is bidimensional. Second, there is no
reason for the KS equilibrium to coincide with the policy pair most-preferred by an individual
of \median type".
The following proposition (proved in Appendix 5) sheds more light on the characteristics of
the functions xm(y) and ym(x):
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, we have that dym(x)
dx
 0 and that dxm(y)
dy
 0{ i.e.,
the policy variables x and y are strategic complements.
There is little we can say at this level of generality about the existence or characteristics of
the Stackelberg equilibria, and their relationship with the KS equilibria.12 In order to illustrate
12We study in the last Appendix the determinants of the concavity of the function U(; x)  V (; x; ym (x)),
i.e., the utility function used by voters in the rst stage of the game where they vote rst over x and then over
y. This appendix shows the complexity of the task of assessing the concavity of U(:), since it includes several
partial derivatives of order three.
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our model, we now turn to the framework used most often in the formal political science
literature, namely the spatial model where voters are assumed to have quadratic preferences
(Banks and Austen-Smith (1999), Ordeshook (1986)). This will also allow us to show how
multiple KS equilibria can arise.
The utility function of a voter of type (1; 2) is dened here as follows:
V (; x; y) =  

x  1 y   2
0B@ a11 a12
a21 a22
1CA
0B@ x  1
y   2
1CA
=  a11 (x  1)2   a12 (x  1) (y   2) (13)
 a21 (x  1) (y   2)  a22 (y   2)2 ;
where A 
0B@ a11 a12
a21 a22
1CA is a symmetric positive denite matrix {i.e., a12 = a21, a11 > 0
and a11a22   a12a21 > 0. In words, voters dier only in the (bidimensional) location of their
most-preferred policy, but share the same shape of indierence curves (as represented by the
matrix A). That situation is easy to handle. Through a linear change of variables, we move
from the current variables 1; 2, x and y to new variables 
0
1; 
0
2, x
0 and y0 via a matrix P in
order to change the matrix A into a diagonal matrix A0. In the new space of types, the utility
functions are separable and we obtain therefore that there is a unique KS equilibrium which
moreover coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium.13
Uniqueness follows here from the specic choice of the two-dimensional type space: a type is
the two-dimensional vector of ideal policies. Other parametric specications of the type space
in the spatial model of politics may display dierent features from the one described above,
namely uniqueness14 and coincidence between KS and Stackelberg. This is illustrated in the
following example where the voters are heterogeneous with respect to both the location of their
13Under some more stringent conditions, like for instance the radial symmetry of the density function f , the
KS/Stackelberg equilibrium is also a Condorcet equilibrium when voting simultanesouly over the two policy
dimensions. This was observed by Tullock (1967) in the specic case of a uniform density function.
14Shepsle (1979) constructs Euclidean patterns leading to a multiplicity of KS equilibria. His examples are
straightforward and do not apply here as the set of people admitted to cast a vote varies depending on the
policy dimension being considered.
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most-preferred policy and the shape of their indierence curves (i.e., the direction and intensity
of the correlation between the two policy dimensions).
Let us consider the case depicted in Figure 5 below, where 5 voters are identied by their
ideal policies, located at the points a; b; c; d; e; respectively.
Insert Figure 5 about here
We retain for voters a; d and e the simplest conguration of circular level curves around their
ideal points.15 The indierence curves of individuals b and c are instead represented by two
ellipses centered around their ideal points, for which we choose dierent shapes.16 We depict
in Figure 5a the lines y(; x) (obviously, y(; x) is a horizontal line through point  for voters
 = a; d; e), as well as the locuses ym(x) in bold. We proceed similarly in Figure 5b, showing
the lines x(; y) together with xm(y). Observe that Assumption 3 is satised so that, by
Proposition 8, we have that dym(x)=dx  0 and dxm(y)=dy  0. We report both xm(y) and
ym(x) on Figure 6, and we obtain 3 KS equilibria: points c and d, but also a third point k

that does not correspond to any voter's most-preferred location!
Insert Figure 6 about here
As for Stackelberg equilibria, observe rst that both U(; x) = V (; x; ym(x)) and W (; y) =
V (; y; xm(y)) are concave and single-peaked for all ve voters. Moreover, location c constitutes
the unique Stackelberg equilibrium, whatever the sequence of votes.
This example then shows that i) we may have multiple KS equilibria, ii) KS equilibria
need not be Stackelberg equilibria and iii) KS equilibria need not correspond to any voter's
most-preferred policy.
15We do not represent level curves for these voters to avoid cluttering the gure further.
16The equations of the ellipses represented in the gure are (x  4)2   2(x  4)(y  3) + 2(y  3)2 = 1 for the
small ellipse around b; (= 15 for the bigger one) and 4 (x  5:4)2   3(x  5:4)(y  4) + (y  4)2 = 9 for the level
curve of individual c:
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4 Conclusions
Majority voting over a multidimensional policy space leads in general to negative results, re-
quiring very stringent conditions for the existence of an equilibrium outcome when voting
simultaneously over all dimensions. Such results have induced political economy scholars to
introduce specic and restrictive assumptions on individual preferences, on the distribution of
individuals' types across the population and on the voting rule, often based on a sequential
scheme.
Our paper takes one step back: it assumes utility functions and a distribution of types as
general as possible, and it focuses on two specic alternatives to simultaneous majority voting.
Our analysis of Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria leads to promising results. We show
that it is possible to conclude about the existence of these equilibria starting from simple
single-crossing conditions widely used in the literature. Under the same weak assumptions, we
compare the characteristics of the solutions issued by the two voting procedures under exam,
emphasizing the relevance of the median type preferred policy. We also study the uniqueness
of equilibrium solutions, showing that multiple Kramer-Shepsle equilibria become plausible
when the domain of individual preferences is richer. While developing our analysis in a general
setting, we also study thoroughly an environment modelled in the political economy literature
exploring issues such as the quantity and the location of public goods in modern democracies,
the connection with the size of the nations and the stability of national borders to secession
threats.
Both additional theoretical advances and further applications could enrich and complete
our main ndings. Along the rst line, it would be interesting to study a model where the set
of alternatives consists in a nite hypercube and where voter preferences are orderings. Along
the second research line, we recommend a systematic comparison of KS and ST equilibria in
the main models studied in the applied political economy literature, in the spirit of De Donder,
Le Breton and Peluso (2009).
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Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
i) Since the utility V is concave with respect to x, for any given value of y (resp. x), the
payo of a citizen of type  is maximized for a choice x (y; ) (resp. y(x; )) such that:
@V (; x (y; ) ; y)
@x
= 0 (resp.
@V (; x; y(x; ))
@y
= 0).
From the implicit function theorem, we deduce:
@x (y; )
@
=  
@2V (;x(y;);y)
@@x
@2V (;x(y;);y)
@x2
and
@y (x; )
@
=  
@2V (;x;y(x;))
@@y
@2V (;x;y(x;))
@y2
:
From the concavity of V with respect to x and y and Assumption 1, we get:
@x (y; )
@
 0 and @y (x; )
@
 0:
ii) For any ; the utility function V (; x; y) is single-peaked with respect to x and y. Then,
from the median voter theorem, we know that for any y (resp. x), there exists a majority
equilibrium corresponding to the median value of x(y; ) (resp. y(x; )).
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
From Assumption 1, we deduce that a necessary condition for the status quo (x; y) to be
preferred to any other feasible policy bundle by a majority of voters is
@V (med; x
; y)
@x
= 0 and
@V (med; x
; y)
@y
= 0;
which implies, if V is further assumed to be strictly concave, that (x; y) is the unique ideal
point of the median type voter.
Appendix 3: Majority choice of x in section 2.3
The most-preferred value of x decreases from x  v0 1( 1
	(0)
) to x  v0 1( 1
Min(	(ymed);	(ymed 1)))
as  moves away from med. Without loss of generality, suppose that 	(ymed)  	(ymed   1).
The proportion B(x) of voters with an ideal peak below the xed level x is given by :
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B(x) =
8><>: F

ymed  	 1

1
v0(x)

if x  x;
F

ymed  	 1

1
v0(x)

+
h
1  F

ymed +	
 1

1
v0(x)
i
if x  x;
where x is the unique solution to the equation
v0(x) =
1
	(ymed   1) :
When F is symmetric, ymed =
1
2
, x = x and B is a cumulative distribution function on
[x; x] dened as follows:
B(x) = 2F

1
2
 	 1

1
v0(x)

:
Then, the majority choice xmed is the unique solution x to the equation :
F

1
2
 	 1

1
v0(x)

=
1
4
:
For instance, when F is uniform, xmed is the peak of a voter located at a distance from the
median equal to 1
4
.
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 6 ii)
The rst-order condition for y of an individual  is given by
v0(xm(y))	(y   )dxm(y)
dy
+ v(xm(y))	
0(y   )  dxm(y)
dy
= 0:
Our objective is to assess under which circumstances the value of y that maximizes W (y; )
diers from  (which is the \true peak" of the utility function{i.e., the value of y that maximizes
V (; x; y) for any given value of x). To this eect, we evaluate the derivative ofW (y; ) at y = 
to obtain
@W (y; )
@y
jy= = dxm()
dy
[v0(xm())	(0)  1] + v(xm())	0(0):
The function xm(y) is characterized by the equality v
0(xm(y))	(d)  1 = 0; where d = ()
if y    y and d =    med if  < y or  > y. Therefore, the above derivative is equal
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to
@W (y; )
@y
jy= = v0(xm()) [	(0) 	(d)] dxm()
dy
+ v(xm())	
0(0)
= v0(xm()) [	(0) 	(d)] dxm()
dy
;
as 	0(0) = 0. Since 	(0) 	(d) > 0; the sign of the derivative at y =  is the same as the sign of
dxm()=dy. If  < y
, xm() = x(; med) so that dxm()=dy > 0. If  > y, xm() = x(; med)
so that dxm()=dy > 0. If y
    y, xm() = x(;   ()) and we obtain that
dxm(y)
dy
=  v
0(xm(y))	0((y))
v00(xm(y))	((y))
d(y)
dy
:
Since 	0() < 0, the sign of dxm(y)=dy is the opposite of the sign of d(y)=dy. From the
denition of (y) and the implicit function theorem, we obtain that
d(y)
dy
=
f(y    (y))  f(y +  (y))
f(y +  (y)) + f(y    (y)) ;
so that the sign of d(y)=dy depends exclusively upon the shape of the density function f:
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 8
Dierentiating (12) with respect to x; we getZ +1
 1

@2 (1; x; ym(x))
@x
+
@2 (1; x; ym(x))
@y
dym(x)
dx

f (1; 2 (1; y;x)) d1 = 0;
which implies that
dym(x)
dx
=  
R +1
 1
@2(1;x;ym(x))
@x
f (1; 2 (1; x; y)) d1R +1
 1
@2(1;x;ym(x))
@y
f (1; 2 (1; x; y)) d1
:
On the other hand, dierentiating
@V (1; 2 (1; x; y) ; x; y)
@y
= 0
with respect to x and y leads to
@2 (1; x; y)
@x
=  
@2V (1;2(1;x;y);x;y)
@y@x
@2V (1;2(1;x;y);x;y)
@y@2
; (14)
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and
@2 (1; x; y)
@y
=  
@2V (1;2(1;x;y);x;y)
@2y
@2V (1;2(1;x;y);x;y)
@y@2
: (15)
We deduce that
dym(x)
dx
=  
R +1
 1
@2V (1;2(1;x;ym(x));x;ym(x))
@y@x
@2V (1;2(1;x;ym(x));x;ym(x))
@y@2
f (1; 2 (1; x; ym(x))) d1
R +1
 1
@2V (1;2(1;x;ym(x));x;ym(x))
@2y
@2V (1;2(1;x;ym(x));x;ym(x))
@y@2
f (1; 2 (1; x; ym(x))) d1
: (16)
Given the concavity of V with respect to y and Assumption 4, the sign of dym(x)
dx
is the same as
the sign of @
2V (1;2;x;y)
@y@x
, which is non negative by Assumption 3.
The same observations apply of course to the derivative of xm with respect to y.
Appendix 6: Concavity of the rst-period utility function U(,x)
In this appendix, we examine the primitive conditions for the sign of @
2U(;x)
@x2
when individ-
uals vote rst over x and then over y.
- One-dimensional types
The second-order derivative @2U(; x)=@x2 of the reduced utility function of a citizen of
type  is:
@2V (; x; ym (x))
@x2
+ 2
@2V (; x; ym (x))
@x@y
dym (x)
dx
+ (17)
@2V (; x; ym (x))
@y2
dym (x)
dx
+
@V (; x; ym (x))
@y
d2ym (x)
dx2
:
From this, we see that a key element to guarantee the existence of a ST equilibrium is the sign
of the second-order derivative d2ym (x) =dx
2. From the dierentiation of (4), we obtain
d2ym (x)
dx2
=  
h
@3V (med;x;ym(x))
@x2@y
+ @
3V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y2
dym(x)
dx
i
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
2
+
h
@3V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y2
+ @
3V (med;x;ym(x))
@y3
dym(x)
dx
i
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
2 ;
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and therefore, by using (4) again
d2ym (x)
dx2
=
"
@3V (med;x;ym(x))
@x2@y
+ @
3V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y2
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
#
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
2
 
"
@3V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y2
+ @
3V (med;x;ym(x))
@y3
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
#
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@x@y
@2V (med;x;ym(x))
@y2
2
We then substitute this expression of d2ym (x) =dx
2 into (17). As we can see, checking that
@2U(; x)=@x2  0 is quite tricky as it involves the sign of many high-order partial derivatives,
including third-order cross derivatives. No general principle can be provided and it is necessary
to proceed to this computation for each specic environment.
-Two-dimensional types
We have that
@U(; x)
@x
=
@V (; x; ym (x))
@x
+
@V (; x; ym (x))
@y
dym(x)
dx
;
which implies in turn
@2U(; x)
@x2
=
@2V (; x; ym (x))
@x2
+ 2
@2V (; x; ym (x))
@x@y
dym(x)
dx
+
@2V (; x; ym (x))
@y2

dym(x)
dx
2
+
@V (; x; ym (x))
@y
d2ym(x)
dx2
:
While the sign of the rst three terms can be deduced from our assumptions, the sign of
the last term depends upon more information. The value of the second-order derivative d
2ym(x)
dx2
is obtained by dierentiation of (16):
d2ym(x)
dx2
=
R +1
 1 [(1; 2; x)H(1; 2; x)  S(1; 2; x) (1; 2; x)] f (1; 2 (1; x; ym(x))) d1R +1
 1 H(1; 2; x)f (1; 2 (1; x; ym(x))) d1
2 ;
where
S(1; 2; x) 
@2V (1;2(1;x;ym(x));x;ym(x))
@y@x
@2V (1;2(1;x;ym(x));x;ym(x))
@y@2
;
35
H(1; 2; x) 
@2V (1;2(1;x;ym(x));x;ym(x))
@2y
@2V (1;2(1;x;ym(x));x;ym(x))
@y@2
;
(1; 2; x)  @S(1; 2; x)
@x
f (1; 2 (1; x; ym(x))) +
S(1; 2; x)
@f(1; 2 (1; x; ym(x))
@2

@2 (1; x; y)
@x
+
@2 (1; x; y)
@y
dym(x)
dx

;
and
 (1; 2; x)  @H(1; 2; x)
@x
f (1; 2 (1; x; ym(x)))
+H(1; 2; x)
@f(1; 2 (1; x; ym(x))
@2

@2 (1; x; y)
@x
+
@2 (1; x; y)
@y
dym(x)
dx

:
To conclude, it is of course necessary to evaluate (1; 2; x) and  (1; 2; x). Using (14),
(15) and (16), we can replace @2(1;x;y)
@x
, @2(1;x;y)
@y
and dym(x)
dx
by expressions depending upon
the primitives. The sign of @S(1;2;x)
@x
and @H(1;2;x)
@x
depends however on third-order partial
derivatives. Note, nally, that the sign of the rst derivative of the density function f also
appears in the expression of d
2ym(x)
dx2
.
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Figure 1: Voters favoring direction d=(dx,dy)
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Figure 3 : Second-stage vote over x with one-sided
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